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The Fourth Estate' and the Third Level:
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission-C able Television
and Intermediate Scrutiny
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 5, 1992, after lengthy debate,' presidential veto, and
Congressional override,' the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 became law.' The Cable Act of 1992, which
reimposed federal controls on the cable industry after a brief eight-year
period of deregulation was a "breathtakingly regulatory piece of legisla-
tion," reinstating the rate regulations which had been removed by the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.' One section of the 1992
1. As to the oft-used term "the Fourth Estate," as well as its recognized impor-
tance, consider the following:
But does not, though the name Parliament subsists, the parliamentary debate
go on now, everywhere and at all times, in a far more comprehensive way,
out of Parliament altogether? Burke said there were Three Estates in Parlia-
ment; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more
important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying; it
is a literal fact-very momentous to us in these times.
THOMAS CARLYLE, CARLYLE'S LECTURES ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN
HISTORY 149 (P. C. Perry ed., 1910).
2. See S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133-1230; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231-86; see also Cable* Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1460.
3. President's Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 1992 PuB. PAPERS 1751-52
(Oct. 3, 1992) [hereinafter President's Message]; see infra note 60 and accompanying
text.
4. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. -
5. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 521-558 (Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Cable Act of 19921.
6. See generally Frank W. Lloyd, The 1992 Cable Act: The Reregulation Pendulum
Swings, 2 COMM. LAW. 1 (1993) (discussing the Cable Act of 1992). The 1984 Act also
gave the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for the first time, direct legisla-
tively-sanctioned authority to regulate cable, by amending the 1934 Act with a new
Title VI. See S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1992), reprinted in 1992
Act, the so-called "must-carry" provision, which requires that cable
operators carry, free of charge, a certain number of local broadcast sta-
tions,7 would, eighteen months later, force the Supreme Court to con-
front an issue it had successfully dodged for almost two decades.' In a
decision characterized as "fragmented," the High Court for the first time
outlined the level of First Amendment scrutiny applicable to cable tele-
vision operators-the mid-tier O'Brien9 approach.'" Yet, when called
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1134.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 534. The section reads, in pertinent part:
§ 534. Carriage of local commercial television signals
(a) Carriage obligations
Each cable operator shall carry, on the cable system of that operator,
the signals of local commercial television stations and qualified low power
stations as provided by this section. Carriage of additional broadcast signals
on such system shall be at the discretion of such operator, subject to section
325(b) of this title.
(b) Signals required
(1) In general
(A) A cable operator of a cable system with 12 or fewer
usable activated channels shall carry the signals of at least three local com-
mercial television stations, except that if such a system has 300 or fewer
subscribers, it shall not be subject to any requirements under this section so
long as such system does not delete from carriage by that system any signal
of a broadcast television station.
(B) A cable operator of a cable system with more than 12
usable activated channels shall carry the signals of local commercial televi-
sion stations, up to one-third of the aggregate number of usable activated
channels of such system.
Id.
8. Greater Free Speech Protection For Cable, N.Y.J., June 28, 1994, at 1, 1. The
two previous cases involving must-carry provisions were decided at the district court
level, with the Supreme Court denying certiorari in both. See infra notes 26-51 and
accompanying text. This led at least one commentator to charge that the Court was
"ducking the issue" on cable's level of scrutiny. Claudia MacLachlan, High Court
Holds TiVs Future: Cable Mounts First Amendment Fight to Bar Broadcasters, 7
NAT'L LJ., Jan. 10, 1994, at 1, 29.
9. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
10. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994). In O'Brien,
the government prosecuted David O'Brien for burning his selective service registration
certificate in violation of federal law. 391 U.S. at 369. O'Brien appealed his convic-
tion, contending that the statute was an unconstitutional burden on his speech. Id. at
370. The Court held that the statute was constitutional "both as enacted and as ap-
plied." Id. at 372.
The Court determined that the statute imposed only an incidental burden on
speech, as it was directed at nonspeech conduct. Id. at 376-77. In examining such
burdens, the Court stated:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
[Vol. 23: 651, 1996] TBS v. FCC
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upon to answer the question of whether the current must-carry provi-
sions are constitutional under that intermediate level of scrutiny, the
Court responded with a resounding "maybe.""
This Note examines the Court's decision in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC.'2 Part II discusses the history of cable regulation
predating the 1992 Cable Act.'3 Part III states the facts of the case,"
and Part IV analyzes the opinions of the divided Court. Part V out-
lines the impact of the case, both present and future.'" The Note con-
cludes with Part VI.'7
II. THE HISTORY OF CABLE REGULATION AND MUST-CARRY
A. Regulation-1949 to 1986
From its nascence in 1949,8 the role of cable in the communications
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.
Id. at 317.
In its analysis, the Court stated that the power of Congress to require registration
for the selective service was "beyond question." Id. (quoting Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742, 756 (1948)). The Court also determined that the proper functioning of the
selective service system was a substantial governmental interest. Id. at 381. Lastly, the
Court determined that the law "specifically protect[ed] this substantial governmental
interest." Id.
11. While the Court determined the applicable level of scrutiny, it did not defini-
tively pronounce on the validity or invalidity of the must-carry provisions. See Turner,
114 S. Ct at 2472. It is unfortunate that this controversy must drag on even longer.
The constitutionality of the "must-carry" provisions is, in the words of Jack Goodman,
special counsel to the National Association of Broadcasters, a "life-or-death question."
MacLachlan, supra note 8, at 1. Andrew Schwartzman of the Media Access Project
remarked that this case would "dramatically affect how cable and broadcast will
interrelate," and that if the provisions are not upheld "[t]he future of free, over-the-air
broadcast [will be] significantly harmed." Id. at 29.
12. 114 S. Ct 2445 (1995); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 18-61 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 72-257 and accompanying text
16. See infra notes 258-70 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
18. The first non-commercial station was constructed in Astoria, Oregon, in 1949;
the first commercial station was built in Lansford, Pennsylvania, in 1950. Inquiry Into
the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations,
regulatory scheme has defied definition. At that time, the statutory
framework for interstate communications regulation was outlined in the
Communications Act of 1934.20 Although the Communications Act of
1934 gave the FCC authority to regulate "all interstate and foreign com-
munication by wire or radio,"2' as late as 1959 the Commission de-
clined to extend jurisdiction over cable, stating that it was within "nei-
ther of the principal regulatory categories created by the Communica-
tions Act."22
Beginning in i960, however, the FCC "gradually asserted jurisdiction"
over cable. 3 In the twenty years afterward, cable became one of the
most heavily-regulated industries in America.
After years of tight regulation, in 1984, Congress, bowing to pressure
from the more laissez-faire Reagan Administration, essentially deregu-
lated cable rates with the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.24
and TV "Repeaters" On the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C.
403, 408 (1959).
19. As one author noted, "[l]ike other industries that eventually found themselves
under pervasive regulatory schemes, cable television developed before a national poli-
cy was in place as to who should regulate it, and what that scheme should be."
Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DuKE LJ. 329,
329 (1988).
20. Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-612 (1988 & Supp. 1992), as
amended by the Cable Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-558.
21. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1988). The FCC has the sole power to allocate the broad-
cast spectrum, to establish standards for operation, and to license users. T. BARTON
CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE, THE LAW OF MASS
MEDIA 633 (5th ed. 1991).
22. Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Sys., 26 F.C.C. at 429; see,
e.g., Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 254 (1958) (holding that
CATV is not a "common carrier" as identified in the Communication Act of 1934); see
also Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between TV Broadcasting and Cable TV,
65 F.C.C.2d 9, 11 (1977) (noting the failure of the FCC to regulate cable at its incep-
tion).
23. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 165 (1968). This asser-
tion of authority by the FCC in the absence of specific legislative mandate was even-
tually validated by the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable. The Court held that the
powers granted to the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934 were expansive,
giving the FCC the ability to regulate new forms of communication. Id. at 168 n.8.
As part of its legislative powers, the FCC has the authority to issue cease-and-
desist orders, to shorten a station's renewal license -period, to impose fines, to deny
a license renewal, and even to revoke an existing license. FORD ROwAN, BROADCAST
FAIRNESS--DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
AND EQUAL TIME RuLE 41 (1984).
24. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-639 (1988) (super-
seded by the Cable Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-558 [hereinafter 1984 Act]. The
1984 Act was essentially a compromise between the interests of the National Cable
Television Association (representing cable operators) and the National League of Cit-
ies (representing franchisors-the cities themselves). Brenner, supra note 19, at 351.
[Vol. 23: 651, 1996] TBS v. FCC
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Despite rate deregulation, the FCC continued to enforce must-carry
rules, requiring cable television operators to carry "upon request and
without compensation" all broadcast stations "significantly viewed in
the community."" In Quincy Cable TV v. FCC,26 a three-judge panel
composed of Judges Skelly Wright, Robert Bork, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg held that these must-carry rules were "fundamentally At odds
with the First Amendment and, as currently drafted, can no longer be
permitted to stand."27
In a very detailed opinion by Judge Wright, the court examined the
history of FCC regulation of both broadcast and cable, noting that "al-
most from the beginning, the must-carry rules were a centerpiece of the
FCC's efforts to actively oversee the growth of cable television."28
Judge Wright found that the FCC's goal was simple: "to assure that the
advent of cable technology not undermine the financial viability of free,
community-oriented television. "'
In a review of precedent, Judge Wright noted that while several ap-
proaches had been taken over the years, federal courts were increasing-
ly examining these rules with a rather "rigorous constitutional analy-
sis."' While not enumerating the level of scrutiny applicable to cable,
the court examined the applicability of both the relaxed broadcast stan-
dard and the mid-tier O'Brien interest-balancing test.'
First examining the broadcast standard, Judge Wright summarily
dismissed it, stating that "the 'scarcity rationale' has no place in evaluat-
ing government regulation of cable television."32
For the cable operators, the 1984 Act deregulated all rates for new franchisees,
while regulating only basic tier rates for pre-existing, grandfathered franchises. See
Hogan & Hartson, The New Cable Communications Act Policy, in THE CABLE COMMU-
NICATIONS POLICY ACT OF 1984 7-9 (Jay E. Ricks & Richard E. Wilery, eds., 1985); see
also 1984 Act 47 U.S.C. §§ 543, 623(c)(3), 623(f)(1) (superseded by the Cable Act of
1992). For the cities, the 1984 Act established guidelines for granting franchises. 47
U.S.C. § 542(b) (superseded by the Cable Act of 1992).
25. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (quoting 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-76.61 (1984)).
26. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
27. Id. at 1438.
28. Id. at 1440.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1444.
31. Id. at 1448.
32. Id. at 1449. For a discussion of the scarcity rationale, see infra notes 95-103
and accompanying text. The scarcity rationale allows regulation of limited resources.
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-99 (1969).
In examining the rules under the O'Brien approach, the court ex-
pressed doubt as to whether the must-carry rules are, indeed, an inci-
dental burden on speech, stating flatly that "[t]he rules coerce
speech." ' Additionally, requiring cable operators to carry certain chan-
nels interfered with the editorial function of cable operators.' Never-
theless, the court concluded that even if it assumed that the burden
was incidental, the must-carry rules failed the analysis.'
The first prong of the O'Brien test is that a substantial government
interest! must exist. 6 As the court noted, "a 'regulation perfectly rea-
sonable and appropriate in the face of a given problem may be highly
capricious if that problem does not exist."'37
Given that the stated rationale for must-carry was protection of local
broadcasters, the fatal flaw in the Commission's actions was that their
dire predictions of the demise of the broadcast industry were based not
on empirical data, but instead on "intuition" and "instinct."' Indeed, in
the twenty years since must-carry was first promulgated, the FCC had
"never reconsidered or seriously questioned the elaborate and conced-
edly speculative premises on which its economic defense of the rules
rests."' In questioning the need for protecting local broadcasters, the
court relied heavily on the fact that:
[Ilt [the Commission] has never sought support for the assumptions that are the
linchpins of its analysis: (1) that without protective regulations cable subscribers
would cease to view locally available off-the-air television... and (2) that even if
some cable subscribers did abandon local television, they would do so in suffi-
cient numbers to affect the economic vitality of local broadcasting.' °
Thus, the government had fallen "far short of the burden... to prove
the substantiality of the interest served by the rules."4' Therefore, the
33. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1452.
34. Id. at 1452 n.39; see also Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (forcing newspaper to print candidate's reply under a right of reply statute
violated newspaper's First Amendment rights); infra note 147. Nonetheless, the court
did not find this dispositive, perhaps subconsciously preferring the active exercise of
the editorial function of a newspaper editor to the passive exercise of the cable op-
erator.
35. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1454.
36. Id.; see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
37. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1455 (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,
36 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (quoting City of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 458
F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
38. Id. at 1442, 1459 (quoting Inquiry Into Economic Relationship Between TV
Broadcasting and Cable TV, 65 F.C.C.2d 9, 14 (1977)).
39. Id. at 1442.
40. Id. at 1457.
41. Id.
[Vol. 23: 651, 19961 TBS v. FCC
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court voided the rules, stating that "[s]hould the Commission wish to
recraft the rules in a manner more sensitive to the First Amendment
concerns we outline today, it is, of course, free to do so."42
Some sixteen months after Quincy, the FCC did just that. These new
rules were immediately challenged in Century Communications Corp. v.
FCC,43 in which the court held that again it had "no choice but to strike
down this latest embodiment of must-carry."'
Relying heavily on Quincy, the court again rejected the application of
the scarcity rationale used to justify lesser protection of broadcasters'
First Amendment rights and stated that it "offer[ed] no succor to those
seeking to establish the constitutional validity of cable television regula-
tions.""
While declining, as in Quincy, to determine the level of scrutiny appli-
cable to cable, the court concluded that, even if the lower O'Brien stan-
dard were applicable, the regulations failed.46 While admitting that the
FCC had corrected some of the problems with the previous must-carry
rules, the FCC still failed to make a showing of a substantial governmen-
tal interest. 7 The court noted that "the FCC's judgment that [must-carry]
rules are needed is predicated not upon substantial evidence but rather
upon several highly dubious assertions" which provided "scant evidence"
that such rules were, indeed, necessary. Indeed, the court cited data
which seemed to indicate that cable companies were not a threat to
over-the-air television, stating that "during the 16 months that elapsed
between Quincy Cable TV and the reimposition of the modified must-
carry rules, cable companies generally did not drop the local broadcast
signals that they had been carrying prior to Quincy Cable TV"49 The
court further noted that, even if the threat to broadcasters were real, the
must-carry provisions were not sufficiently narrowly tailored so as to
pass the second prong of the O'Brien balancing test.' In concluding
42. Id. at 1463.
43. 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), order clarified by 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
44. Id. at 305.
45. Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 298. Improvements in the new must-carry rules included limiting the
number of local stations that cable companies had to carry and eliminating the
requirement that the companies carry duplicative programming. Id.
48. Id. at 300.
49. Id. at 303.
50. Id. at 303-04.
that the must-carry provisions were unconstitutional, the court main-
tained that "when trenching on first amendment interests, even inciden-
tally, the government must be able to adduce either empirical support or
at least sound reasoning on behalf of its measures.""' This effectively
ended must-carry, albeit momentarily.
B. The Cable Act of 1992
In 1990, spurred by concerns of their constituents over recent rate
hikes, 2 Senators John Danforth and Daniel Inouye introduced a bill
which eventually became the Cable Act of 1992.' The Senators' goal
was simple-to spur competition in the cable industry, thereby producing
lower rates for consumers.' While rate regulation" was the primary fo-
51. Id. at 304. It is apparent from the preceding line of cases that if Congress
wished to craft must-carry rules that would withstand the court's scrutiny, empirical
data to support the inference that off-the-air television is at risk would have to be
presented. Congress obviously heeded this requirement in passing the Cable Act of
1992. Congress also obviously heeded the dictates of the courts, specifically redress-
ing several problems noted in these two cases. For instance, in Quincy, the court
noted that the rules were overly broad, as they required the carriage of all local
broadcast stations. See S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1172. The current Act addresses that in two sections: first, by
limiting the number of local broadcast stations which must be carried to "up to one-
third of the aggregate number of usable activated channels of such system," and,
second, by not requiring the carriage of any station which "substantially duplicates"
the programming of another local station carried on that system. 47 U.S.C.
§ 534(b)(1), (5) (Supp. V 1993).
52. The town of Eau Claire, Wisconsin, for example, saw an increase of some
206% with the advent of deregulation. 138 CONG. REC. H11477, H11479 (1992) (re-
marks of Rep. Gunderson).
Additionally, many consumers were outraged over the poor service which they
received from their local operators. One Congressman noted that New York had to
amend the charter of its local cable company to force them to answer the telephone,
calling it "an example of public be damned." 138 Cong. Rec. H11485 (1992)
(statement of Rep. Dingell).
53. Pub. L No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992); see 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-558 (Supp. V
1993).
54. Congress stated that the purpose of the 1992 Act was "to promote competition
in the multichannel video marketplace and to provide protection for consumers
against monopoly rates and poor customer service." S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133.
There is little doubt that cable television needs some form of regulation. After
all, one commentator stated that "cable's significant technological and economic ad-
vantages will probably make it the dominant medium of the future." Eli M. Noam,
Local Distribution Monopolies in Cable Television and Television Service: The Scope
For Competition, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW 351, 359
(Eli M. Noam ed., 1983). Indeed, Congress stated that "[clable television has become
our Nation's dominant video distribution medium." S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.KN. 1133, 1135.
55. See, e.g., the FCC's mandate to ensure that rates set are "reasonable." 47
[Vol. 23: 651, 19961 TBS v. FCC
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cus of the Act,' the must-carry provisions were also viewed as an im-
portant point by the bill's sponsors."
After passing both houses,' Congress sent the bill to President Bush,
who had previously expressed his misgivings.' President Bush vetoed
the bill, stating that, while "long on promises," the bill was simply a case
U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993); see also 47 U.S.C. § 543(c) (Supp. V 1993) (permit-
ting the regulation of unreasonable rates). Thus, rates for the basic service tier are
regulated in almost every community in America. Charles D. Ferris, et al., Cable Tele-
vision Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW:
A VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICE GUIDE 1 (Supp. 1992).
56. See MacLachlan, supra note 8, at 29.
57. See S. REP. No. 92, 2, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1196-97.
In order to avoid a result similar 'to that of the previous two must-carry provi-
sions, during deliberations on the 1992 Act Congress "deliberately constructed a thor-
ough record to buttress its contention that must-carry rules were essential to the
economic preservation of free over-the-air television and its free speech rights."
MacLachlan, supra note 8, at 29.
Among the supporters of the Act were the AFL-CIO, the UAW, the National
League of Cities, the National Association of State Attorneys-General, the U.S. Confer-
ence of Mayors, and, of course, local broadcasters. 138 CONG. REc. H11477, H11485
(1992).
58. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
59. In his Letter to Congressional Leaders on Cable Television Legislation, Presi-
dent Bush wrote:
I am writing to express my strong opposition to the Conference Report
to accompany S. 12 (Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992), which the House and Senate will consider in the next several
days.
This legislation will hurt Americans by imposing a wide array of costly,
burdensome, and unnecessary requirements on the cable industry and the
government agencies that regulate it. The heavy-handed provisions of the bill
will drive up cable industry costs, resulting in higher consumer rates, not
rate reductions as promised by the supporters of the bill.
The bill will also restrain continued innovation in the industry, cost the
economy jobs, reduce consumer programming choices, and retard the deploy-
ment of growth-oriented investments critical to the future of our Nation's
communications infrastructure.
My vision for the future of the communications industry is based on the
principles of greater competition, entrepreneurship, and less economic regula-
tion. This legislation fails each of these tests and is illustrative of the Con-
gressional mandates and excessive regulations that drag our economy down.
Congress would best serve consumer welfare by promoting vigorous compe-
tition, not massive re-regulation.
For these reasons I will veto S. 12 if it is presented to me, and I urge
its rejection when the House and Senate consider the Conference Report.
1992-93 PUB. PAPERS 1588 (Sept. 17, 1992).
of "good intentions gone wrong."' The President's opposition notwith-
standing, Congress voted to override his veto, with one Representative
even calling the Cable Act of 1992 "the most important piece of consum-
er legislation in this Congress. ""
60. President's Message, supra note 3, at 1751-52. The veto read, in its entirety:
To the Senate of the United States:
I am returning herewith without my approval S. 12, the "Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992." This bill illus-
trates good intentions gone wrong, fallen prey to special interests.
Contrary to the claims made by its proponents, this legislation will not
reduce the price Americans pay for cable television service. Rather, the sim-
ple truth is that under this legislation cable television rates will go up, not
down. Competition will not increase, it will stagnate. In addition, this legis-
lation will cost American jobs and discourage investment in telecommunica-
tions, one of our fastest growing industries.
S. 12 is clearly long on promises. Unfortunately, it is just as clearly
short on relief to the American families who are quite rightly concerned
about significant increases in their cable rates and poor cable service. Al-
though the proponents of S. 12 describe the bill as procompetitive, it simply
is not. Indeed, the only truly competitive provision, one that would have
expanded the ability of telephone companies to compete with cable compa-
nies in rural areas, was dropped from the bill at the last minute.
S. 12 tries to address legitimate consumer concerns, but it does so by
requiring cable companies to bear the costs of meeting major new federally
imposed regulatory requirements and by adopting costly special interest provi-
sions. For example, the bill requires cable companies for the first time to
pay broadcasting companies, who have free access to the airwaves, to carry
the broadcasters' programs. The undeniable result: higher rates for cable
viewers.
Beyond increasing consumer costs, the bill takes certain key business
decisions away from cable operators and puts them in the hands of the Fed-
eral Government. One provision, which is unconstitutional, requires cable
companies to carry certain television stations regardless of whether the view-
ing public wants to see these stations. Another special interest provision
would put the Federal Government in the position of dictating to cable com-
panies to whom and at what price they could sell their programs. These
types of federally mandated outcomes will discourage continued investment in
new programs to the detriment of cable subscribers who have come to ex-
pect a wide variety of programming and new services.
I believe that the American people deserve cable television legislation
that, unlike S. 12, will deliver what it promises: fair rates, good programming,
and sound service.
Id.
61. 138 CONG. REc. H11353, H11483 (1992) (remarks of Rep. Cooper). President
Bush's veto resparked the controversy in both houses of Congress, reflecting deep
ideological differences in the effect and effectiveness of regulatory legislation. In the
House of Representatives, opponents, mainly Republicans, argued against overriding
the veto, warning that it could cost consumers up to three billion dollars. 138 Cong.
Rec. H11480 (comments of Rep. Hughes). One of the most vocal opponents was Re-
publican Rep. Newt Gingrich of Georgia, who called one portion of the bill "probably
[Vol. 23: 651, 1996] TBS v. FCC
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Ill. FACTS OF THE CASE
Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion' challenged the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992.' After Congress enacted the Cable Act of 1992,64 numerous cable
programmers and operators' challenged the must-carry provisions, argu-
ing that they violate the First Amendment' because they interfere with
the greatest con job of recent times." 138 Cong. Rec. H11486.
In the Senate, opponents called the bill "flawed" and with "potentially harmful
consequences." 138 Cong. Rec. 816656 (remarks of Sen. Chafee). In a strong attack
on the effectiveness of the regulation, Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi stated "[iln its
wisdom, the Senate, in 1984, deregulated the cable industry, and what did we have?
We had an explosion of development, innovation, opportunity; things really improved
all across this country. It worked. Deregulation worked." 138 Cong. Rec. S16658. After
stating that the current bill would actually drive up the price to consumers, Senator
Lott noted that the must-carry provisions posed "serious constitutional questions." Id.
Despite these dire predictions, the Cable Act passed by a margin of 308 to 114
in the House and by a margin of 74 to 25 in the Senate. 138 Cong. Rec. H11487,
S16676.
62. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). Prior to this action, Turner Broadcasting System (TBS)
had applied for injunctive relief. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 113 S. Ct. 1806,
1807-08 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (denying relief on the ground that it was not "indis-
putably clear" that TBS had a right to be free from regulation).
63. See supra note 7.
64. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
65. Those challenging the Act included cable programmers, such as TBS, the Arts
& Entertainment Network, Black Entertainment Television, Discovery, E! Entertain-
ment Television, Hearst/ABC-Viacom Entertainment Services, International Family En-
tertainment, National Cable Satellite Corporation, QVC Network, The Travel Channel,
USA Networks, as well as cable operators, such as Daniel Cablevision, Time Warner,
and National Cable Television. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 34
(D.D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
Those defending the provisions included the United States, the FCC, the AFL-
CIO, the Association of America's Public Television Stations, the Association of Inde-
pendent Television Stations, Atlanta Interfaith Broadcasters, the Community Broadcast-
ers Association, the Consumer Federation of America, the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Local Community Broadcasters, the National Association of Broadcasters, the National
Association of State Cable Agencies, the National Council of Senior Citizens, the Na-
tional Interfaith Cable Coalition, the National League of Cities, the National Rural
Telecommunications Co-op, the Public Broadcasting Service, Trinity Christian Center,
TV 14, Inc., the United Church of Christ, and Wireless Cable Association Intern., Inc.
Id. at 34-35.
66. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
the cable operators' editorial control and place broadcasters in a pre-
ferred position.67 Unpersuaded by these arguments, a three-judge pan-
el' granted summary judgment for the Justice Department, stating that
"[i]t is not the province of this Court to pass judgment upon the wisdom
of the policies the national legislature has chosen to pursue in such en-
deavors."' The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over the case
on September 28, 1993,70 to resolve the issue of whether the must-carry
provisions of the Cable Act of 1992 are unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
In Justice Kennedy's majority opinion"2 the Court held that the "re-
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
67. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 38.
"All art is at once surface and symbol." OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN
GRAY 10 (1931). Lawsuits-especially those grounded in the First Amendment--often
show this dual nature; the concerns espoused in a brief bear little relation to those
espoused in a boardroom. In the instant case, one need only scratch the surface to
see the more pragmatic reasons motivating this litigation. The distant carriers, such
as TBS, ESPN, et al., needed to persuade the Court to strike down the "must-carry"
provisions in order to preserve their market share. Given the limited number of chan-
nels available to cable operators, if more channels must be set aside for local broad-
cast, there are fewer channels available for distant carriers.
The motivation of the cable operators is somewhat different. With distant pro-
grammers, the cable operator derives revenues from selling advertising inserted during
the programs. With broadcasters, the signals usually come with advertising pre-sold
by the broadcaster. The revenue produced from this pre-sold advertising is, of course,
money in which the cable operator does not share.
68. This panel was created pursuant to § 23 of the 1992 Act. See 47 U.S.C. §
555(c) (Supp. V 1993) (codification of Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 23, 106 Stat. 1460,
1500).
69. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 48. Judge Sporkin, in his concurrence, took TBS to
task for being disingenuous in its suit, as he felt that it was more concerned with
profits than with free speech. Id. at 54. He wrote, "to dress up their complaint in
First Amendment garb demeans the principles for which the First Amendment stands
and the protections it was designed to afford." Id. (Sporkin, J., concurring).
This economic paradigm was roundly criticized by New York Law School Pro-
fessor Michael Botien, who called it "made up." MacLachlan, supra note 8, at 29.
70. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994).
71. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2451 (1994).
72. Id. Justice Kennedy was joined by the Chief Justice, Justices Souter, Blaclkun,
and Stevens. Id. at 2450-51. Justice Stevens, while concurring with much of Justice
Kennedy's reasoning, noted that he would "part ways with him on the appropriate
disposition of the case." Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens did,
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laxed" First Amendment standard applied to broadcast industry regu-
lation is inapplicable to the cable industry.73 Instead, after finding that
the must-carry provisions are content-neutral, the Court analyzed the
provisions under the intermediate level of scrutiny set forth in United
States v. O'Brien,74 essentially weighing the First Amendment rights of
the cable operators against the government's asserted interest in protect-
ing the broadcast industry.75 Seemingly satisfied that a legitimate govern-
ment interest does exist in protecting local broadcast television," the
Court nonetheless remanded the case. Stating that the government had
not satisfied the second prong of the O'Brien test, which requires that
the government prove that the must-carry provisions are narrowly tai-
lored to further the legitimate interest,7
1. Historical Setting of the 1992 Cable Act
In Part One of the opinion, Justice Kennedy examined the role of cable
television, stating that "the cable industry today stands at the center of
an ongoing telecommunications revolution with still undefined potential
to affect the way we communicate and develop our intellectual resourc-
es."78 Next, Justice Kennedy set the stage by briefly recounting the histo-
ry of the 1992 Cable Act, along with the resulting legal challenges in the
court below.7'
2. Level of Scrutiny
In Part Two of his opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that there is "no
disagreement ... [that] cable operators engage in and transmit
speech."' Likewise, the Justice noted that there is no disagreement that
however, join in the remand in order to permit some disposition of the case. Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring); see infra notes 202-19 and accompanying text for an analy-
sis of Justice Stevens' opinion.
73. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457; see infra notes 83-103 for a discussion of the
broadcast standard.
74. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
75. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469-72.
76. Yet, these "local stations" are often simply affiliates of the major three net-
works. See 138 CONG. REc. H11479 (1992) (comments of Rep. Oxley).
77. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2472.
78. Id. at 2451.
79. Id. at 2453; see The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. V 1993); see also Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 819 F.
Supp. 32 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct 2445 (1994).
80. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456. Indeed, the cable operator engages in speech on at
the must-carry provisions do regulate speech, and stated that "[t]he rules
reduce the number of channels over which cable operators exercise un-
fettered control, and they render it more difficult for cable programmers
to compete for carriage on the limited channels remaining."' Given the
existence of both speech and a burden thereupon, the Court had to first
determine the level of scrutiny applicable to cable television before de-
termining the constitutionality of the burden imposed by the must-carry
provisions. 2
a. The Red Lion standard
The Government argued strongly for application of the standard appli-
cable to broadcasters.' That standard was set forth in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC,' where the Supreme Court, in its examination of
the FCC's Fairness Doctrine, upheld the constitutionality of the corollary
"personal attack" doctrine, stating that the rules were "authorized by
Congress and enhance[d] rather than abridge[d] the freedoms of speech
and press protected by the First Amendment." ' Additionally, the Court,
for the first time, iterated the "scarcity rationale."'
The Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to give coverage to each
side on issues of public import.87 The personal attack doctrine required
broadcasters who aired a personal attack to forward a transcript to the
person affected, and to provide them with cost-free time to respond.'
least two levels: first, some cable operators actually produce original programming
such as news, sports, or talk shows; second, the operator engages in speech by exer-
cising editorial control over the selection of programs or services to be carried.
Brenner, supra note 19, at 335-37. Several factors influence the selection of program-
ming, including content (striving to provide a diversity of viewpoints), affiliation with
the parent company, or, most frequently, market considerations. Id. at 337-38; see also
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) (stating that cable operators are
"press"); Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)
(noting that cable operators are members of the press).
81. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
85. Id. at 375. See generally Charles D. Ferris & James A. Kirkland, Fairness: The
Broadcaster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 605 (1985) (discussing the Fair-
ness Doctrine after Red Lion).
This personal attack doctrine has been criticized for failing to serve its underly-
ing policies, for spawning terrible administrative complications, and for infringing on
the First Amendment freedoms of the broadcaster. STEVEN J. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS
DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 87 (1978).
86. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
87. Id. at 369.
88. Id. at 371-72.
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These doctrines were set forth in two forms: first, through a series of
FCC rulings and case law; second, through the Communications Act of
1934,' which provided, with respect to candidates for public office, that
"[i]f any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use
of such broadcasting station."'
Red Lion Broadcasting aired a program in which Fred Cook, an author,
was maligned as a Communist fellow-traveler.' Red Lion refused to pro-
vide Cook with airtime to respond to the attacks.2 After the FCC de-
clared Red Lion in violation of the personal attack doctrine, the broad-
caster took to the courts. 3
Reasoning that the personal attack doctrine was a logical corollary of
the Fairness Doctrine, and noting that the Fairness Doctrine was later
codified, the Court held that the FCC's regulatory mandate was suffi-
ciently broad to permit enforcement of both doctrines.'
While conceding that broadcasters are entitled to First Amendment
protection, the Court stated that broadcasters are not entitled to the
same level of protection as the print media, reasoning that "differences in
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amend-
ment standards applied to them."95 Indeed, Justice White noted that the
very nature of broadcasting led to regulation, stating that
[i]t was this reality which at the very least necessitated first the division of the
radio spectrum into portions reserved respectively for public broadcasting ....
Beyond this, however, because the frequencies reserved for public broadcasting
were limited in number, it was essential for the Government to tell some appli-
cants that they could not broadcast at all because there was room for only a
few.'
This scarcity of frequencies led the Court to the inescapable conclu-
sion that "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish."97 Thus, while the aim of the First Amendment is to provide an
89. Id. at 369-70.
90. Id. at 370 n.1 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1988)).
91. Id. at 371.
92. Id. at 372.
93. Id. at 372-73.
94. Id. at 379-86.
95. Id. at 386.
96. Id. at 388.
97. Id.
"uninhibited marketplace of ideas," it does not preclude the regulation of
broadcasting.'
In fact, the Court, noting that because the public has an interest in the
operation of the broadcast media consistent with the First Amendment,
broadcasters are quasi-trustees of the people.' Calling the license to use
radio frequencies a "privilege," the Court found that "[iut is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount." "
While agreeing that technology allows more efficient use of frequen-
cies, Justice White noted that technology has also invented new ways of
utilizing the frequencies, thereby perpetuating a scarcity.'' Finally, in
defense of the scarcity rationale, Justice White reasoned that the air-
waves are a vital resource of "growing importance." 2 Further, this re-
source must be regulated because it is scarce.' 3
b. The Government's arguments for the Red Lion standard
The Government argued that cable operators should be subject to the
same First Amendment standard as broadcasters, supporting its position
with two arguments: first, a proper interpretation of Red Lion revealed
that the true rationale for the lesser scrutiny for broadcast was not the
scarcity of broadcast frequencies, but "market dysfunction;" and, second,
the must-carry provisions were merely "industry-specific antitrust leg-
islation," and, as such, entitled to lessened scrutiny."
Justice Kennedy, in examining the first argument, stated quite bluntly
that "the rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amend-
ment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases
elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable regulation." "° Ana-
98. Id. at 389-90.
99. Id. at 390.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 397.
102. Id. at 399.
103. Id.
104. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457-58.
105. Id. at 2456. There are, of course, fundamental technological differences be-
tween cable television and off-the-air broadcasting. Cable operators receive signals
from broadcast stations, radio stations, and cable programmers. Brenner, supra note
19, at 332. While originally serving mainly to "boost" local stations with poor recep-
tion, they now serve primarily as importers of distant signals provided by cable pro-
grammers. Brenner, supra note 19, at 335; see United States v. Southwestern Cable,
392 U.S. 157, 163 (1968). These signals are then sent to subscribers by means of
coaxial cables, which are either buried underground or strung along poles. Brenner,
supra note 19, at 332-33. At the subscriber's home, the signal is fed into a converter
box or into a cable-ready TV, which interprets the signals so that the television can
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lyzing the rationale underlying the Court's broadcast exception, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that the broadcast media requires a different stan-
dard because of its "unique physical limitations."' 6 Thus, the Court ex-
pressly rejected the Government's proposed interpretation of Red Lion.
While noting that this scarcity rationale has been much maligned,"'
the Court nonetheless "declined to question its continuing validity. " "°
Despite the validity of the scarcity rationale in the broadcast medium,
Justice Kennedy stated that these same physical limitations are not found
in the cable medium."n He therefore noted that nothing in this case
would "require the alteration of settled principles of our First Amend-
ment jurisprudence."".°
The Court next addressed the government's argument that this is mere-
ly antitrust legislation, meriting rational basis scrutiny."' Although con-
ceding that there may, indeed, be a dysfunction in the cable marketplace,
the Court did not find such a dysfunction dispositive, stating that "laws
receive them. Id. at 333.
Broadcasters, on the other hand, send their signals as radiant energy on speci-
fied channels. CARTER ET AL, supra note 21, at 626. Television utilizes both VHF
(from 30 to 300 MHz) and UHF (from 300 to 3,000 MHz), but relies primarily on
transmission over VHF. Id. at 627, 636. These signals are then intercepted by an
antenna, fed into the television, and translated into a viewable image. Quincy Cable
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
106. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458. Broadcasters are limited by physics-there is a
finite number of broadcast frequencies available in the electromagnetic spectrum. Ini-
tially, 96 channels were allocated for broadcast use, ranging from 550 to 1500 kilocy-
cles. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943). Thus, dur-
ing the development of the broadcast industry, the government was required to divide
the spectrum and assign frequencies. See id. at 210-18 (recounting the evolution of
the FCC and its authority to allocate and assign frequencies). This naturally resulted
in a concomitant abridgement of the "right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
107. See, e.g., RICHARD E. LABUNSKi, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE: THE POLI-
TICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 9 (1981) (asking if conditions have not changed suffi-
ciently so that "'scarcity' no longer accurately describes the availability of broadcast-
ing channels and no longer justifies government regulation"); Matthew L. Spitzer, The
Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1007 (1989).
108. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457.
109. Id.
110. Id. Given that the lower courts had explicitly rejected this theory as inapplica-
ble to cable, it is mystifying why the Government even advanced an argument for it.
See supra note 32, 95-103 and accompanying text.
111. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
that single out the press, or certain elements thereof ... are always sub-
ject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.""'2
c. Content-neutral or content-based?
Before analyzing the must-carry provisions further, the Court first
considered whether the provisions were content-neutral or content-
based,"' stating that "[olur precedents... apply the most exacting
scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content.""' Laws compelling
speech are subject to the same level of scrutiny as those prohibiting
speech."5 If content-neutral, however, the regulations would be subject
to merely an intermediate level of scrutiny."6
Admitting that a determination of whether a regulation is content-
based or content-neutral "is not always a simple task,""'7 the Court stat-
ed that "the 'principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality... is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
[agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys. ''18
The basic test for content-based status is whether a law distinguishes
favored from disfavored speech because of the ideas, viewpoints, or
message it contains."' Generally, a law is content-neutral if it "confer[s]
benefits or impose[s] burdens on speech without reference to the ideas
or views expressed."
20
112. Id.
113. After determining that the Red Lion standard was inapplicable, the Court was
at a crossroads. Should it, as the lower courts had done in Quincy and Century,
simply analyze the must-carry provisions under the intermediate-level protection of
O'Brien without determining, definitively, whether this or the strict scrutiny analysis
was the proper test? Thankfully, it went the one step further.
114. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2459.
115. Id.
116. Id. The Court noted that these regulations receive lesser scrutiny "because in
most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints
from the public dialogue." Id.; see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984) (holding that a Park Service regulation prohibiting camping in Lafay-
ette Park was not content-based when applied to prevent demonstrators from sleeping
there).
117. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2459.
118. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (upholding
a New York City ordinance on the use of a concert amphitheater as a reasonable
regulation of time, place, and manner of speech)).
119. Id.; see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding a Tennessee statute
prohibiting electioneering within 100 feet of a voting-place as narrowly tailored to
further the state's compelling interest in protecting voters from undue influence);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that an ordinance
against picketing foreign embassies was an unconstitutional, content-based restriction).
120. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2459; see City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
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d. Content basis declined
While admitting that the must-carry provisions "interfere with cable
operators' editorial discretion by compelling them to offer carriage," the
Court concluded that "the extent of the interference does not depend
upon the content of the... programming." 2' The Court noted that the
burdens of offering carriage were imposed upon all operators, regardless
of the content of their programming'22 and felt that the Act extracts no
penalty as a result of any program which the cable operator may se-
lect." The Court further concluded that the burden imposed upon ca-
ble programmers was, likewise, unrelated to content, as it "extends to all
cable programmers irrespective of the programming they choose to offer
viewers."'24 Likewise, the benefits conferred by the must-carry provi-
sions are unrelated to content, as "[t]he rules benefit all full power
broadcasters who request carriage. "1
25
In addressing Turner Broadcasting System's (TBS) differential treat-
ment argument, the Court admitted that the must-carry provisions placed
broadcasters in a favored position.'26 Despite this, the requirements
were found to be based upon medium, rather than content.'27 In con-
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting placing signs
on utility poles did not infringe on First Amendment freedom of speech guarantees);
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(upholding a rule requiring that literature at the state fair be distributed only from
registered booths as the least restrictive means of effectively ensuring proper crowd
control).
121. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460.
122. Id.
123. Id. This reasoning seems specious, especially in light of Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See infra note 147. Although not limited in
the same way as broadcasters, cable operators are, nevertheless, subject to the re-
straints of their individual systems. While potentially capable of carrying hundreds of
channels, most systems actually have merely between 30 and 50 activated channels,
which are those capable of use at any given time.
In TorniUo, the Court noted that a penalty was exacted in the amount of ink,
paper, and even time spent by the newspaper in printing viewpoints which they did
not wish to. 418 U.S. at 257-58. It is unclear why, given the relative value of each
active channel, the same "taking" rationale would not apply to cable operators.
124. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460.
125. Id. The Court noted that the rules extended to all full power broadcasters, re-
gardless of whether they are commercial, non-commercial, independent, network-affii-
ated, English, Spanish, religious, or secular. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
cluding his brief treatment of this argument, Justice Kennedy wrote: "So
long as they are not a subtle means of exercising a content preference,
speaker distinctions of this nature are not presumed invalid under the
First Amendment.""
. Purpose of must-carry
After determining that the must-carry provisions are not content-based
prima facie, the Court next examined the "manifest purpose" of the
rules for a basis in content, noting that such an illicit purpose could
invalidate "even a regulation neutral on its face."2"
Despite TBS's contention that Congress' self-avowed interest in pro-
moting localism clearly showed a content preference, the Court stated
simply, "we do not agree.""
Noting the breadth of findings upon which Congress based the Act, the
Court observed that requiring cable systems to carry broadcast stations
would ensure a large enough audience to continue advertising revenues
sufficient to "guarantee the survival of a medium that has become a vital
part of the Nation's communication system."3' The Court also noted
that protecting broadcast television is an "'important and substantial
federal interest.""32
128. Id. at 2460-61. The majority seemed to ignore the legitimate concerns voiced
by Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg. See infra notes 220-57 and accompanying text. In
fact, the Congressional Record clearly supports the contention that Congress consid-
ered local content when the must-carry provisions were debated. See generally S.
REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1991), H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-862, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1136-1286.
129. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2461; see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)
(striking down the Flag Protection Act as clearly intending to suppress free expres-
sion); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993)
(striking down a city ordinance aimed at preventing members of the Santeria religion
from practicing animal sacrifice).
130. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2461.
131. Id. If broadcast's existence is so vital, would these stations not be ripe for
direct government subsidies? Additionally, the Court's reasoning calls to mind Judge
Sporkin's criticism of TBS for bringing this action for purely economic motives. See
supra note 69. It seems clear that the sole rationale for the must-carry provisions, at
least from the broadcasters' standpoint, was economic.
132. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2461 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S.
691 (1984)). The Court stated that Congress' objective was merely to "preserve access
to free television programming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable." Id.
The reasoning behind this is a bit obscure. If a broadcast station was dropped from
every home with cable, instead of being merely one channel among 30, or even 50,
on the cable system, it would now be one of only five or six over-the-air stations.
Thus, while reaching a smaller total number of homes, the actual market share could,
potentially, increase.
If Congress were truly interested in merely ensuring access, the use of an A/B
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In determining that the provisions are unrelated to any particular view-
point, the Court noted that all broadcasters are covered, irrespective of
content." The Court concluded that, given the value Congress placed
upon local broadcasting," the must-carry provisions do nothing more
than "prevent cable operators from exploiting their economic power to
the detriment of broadcasters.""n
As an additional argument that the provisions are content-based, TBS
pointed to the fact that the FCC has greater control over the content of
broadcasters, implying intent on the part of Congress to ensure that par-
ticular programs or program types would be shown on cable." While
agreeing that the FCC does have greater regulatory power over broadcast
television, the Court stated that "the argument exaggerates the extent to
selector switch would be just as effective. This requirement was, however, dropped
from the current Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(e) (Supp. V 1993).
Additionally, if over-the-air television is truly worthy of protection, why are UHF
or low-power stations not afforded the same degree of protection? The preference for
VHF stations (traditional broadcasters) tilts the scales in favor of mainly network-affil-
iated stations, to the exclusion of smaller, independent stations, that need must-carry
even more. For example, in 1971 58% of American homes with televisions that could
receive broadcast had no VHF independent stations. CARTER ET AL., supra note 21 at
636 (citing ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIc ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULAION 168
(1973)).
133. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2461-62. Earlier, the Court noted the conditions under
which a low power broadcast station would be eligible for must-carry. Id. at 2460.
The Act states that such stations must be carried if the FCC determines that it
.would address local news and informational needs which are not being adequately
served by full power television broadcast stations because of the geographic distance
of such full power stations from the low power station's community of license." 47
U.S.C.A. § 534(h)(2)(B).
It seems unlikely that the standard for carriage of a low power station would
stray very far from the Congressional intent behind the main portions of the must-
carry provisions. Additionally, otherwise ineligible broadcast stations may be granted
must-carry status if their programming "provides news coverage of issues of concern
to such community . . . or coverage of sporting and other events of interest to the
community." 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(1)(C)(ii). Both of these sections clearly point to a
content-based preference, showing Congress' intent to preserve a particular point of
view.
134. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2462; see Cable Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. V
1993).
135. Trner, 114 S. Ct. at 2462. The Court ignored the fact that the power cable
operators have is mainly a result of exclusive franchises awarded to them by local
governments. Should cable be penalized for the lawful actions of these bodies? This
almost seems to be a nod to the government's antitrust argument. See supra note
104, 111-12 and accompanying text.
136. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2462-63.
which the FCC is permitted to intrude into matters affecting the content
of broadcast programming. "
137
The Court also noted that the FCC is prohibited from engaging in cen-
sorship,"n interfering with journalistic judgment,'3' or imposing "its pri-
vate notions of what the public ought to hear."'40 Indeed, both commer-
cial and non-commercial stations are subject to the same "public interest,
convenience or necessity" standard.'4 ' Specifically, the Court pointed to
both regulations and case law prohibiting the use of governmental "le-
verage" on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)."' The Court
noted that, given the "minimal extent" of influence over programming
exercised by the FCC and Congress, TBS's concerns were "without foun-
dation."
In concluding its analysis of the content-neutrality of the must-carry
provisions, the Court felt that the provisions were enacted neither to
punish cable,' nor to reward broadcasting, but to "preserve the exist-
ing structure of the Nation's broadcast television medium while permit-
ting the concomitant expansion and development of cable television. ""
137. Id. at 2463. It is interesting to note that the very type of right-of-reply statute
which was invalidated in TorniUo is permitted of broadcasters. See Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); FCC Personal Attacks Rule, 47
C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1993), see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
138. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988)).
139. Id. (quoting Hubbard Broadcasting Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 517, 520 (1974)).
140. Id. (quoting Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25
Fed. Reg. 7291, 7293 (1960)).
141. Id. (quoting En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2312 (1960) (citing
the Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1988) (superseded by the
Cable Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 531-558 (Supp. V 1993))).
142. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2463-64; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 396(g)(1)(D) (1988) (stating that
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) will carry out its activities "in ways
that will most effectively assure the maximum freedom of the public telecommunica-
tions entities and systems from interference with, or control of, program content or
other activities"); id. at 398(a) (mandating that other agencies not "exercise any di-
rection, supervision, or control" over the CPB's programming); see also FCC v.
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984) (holding that a prohibition
on editorializing by stations funded by the CPB was unconstitutional as it sought to
suppress a function of the press which "lies at the heart of First Amendment protec-
tion").
It is rather simplistic to believe that the CPB would not conform, even subcon-
sciously, to the desires of Congress, the one who holds the purse strings. See, e.g.,
Judith Michaeison, PBS President Urges Grass-Roots Lobbying Effort, LA. TIMES, Jan.
5, 1995, at B2 (recounting efforts of the PBS President to secure funding to counter
the threatened cuts from the Republican House).
143. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464.
144. But see 138 CONG. REC. H11477 (1992) (statement of Rep. Lent) (calling the
Act "an attempt to punish the cable industry").
145. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464.
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ii. Compelled speech
To justify application of strict scrutiny, TBS argued that the must-carry
provisions "compel cable operators to transmit speech not of their
choosing."'46 In support of its argument, TBS cited Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo,'47 contending that the same interference with
editorial control which was invalidated in Tornillo was fostered by the
must-carry rules.'48
Despite TBS's contentions, the Court found both Tornillo and Pacific
Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission4 ' inapposite, because
the must-carry provisions are not triggered by the content of the speech.
146. Id.
147. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In TorniUo, the Court invalidated Florida's "right of reply"
statute as violative of the First Amendment. Pat Tornillo, a candidate for the Florida
House of Representatives, was the subject of severely critical editorials by the Miami
Herald. Id. at 243-44. Florida statutes mandated a "right of reply," which stated: "'If
any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for
nomination or for election in any election . . . such newspaper shall upon request of
such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make there-
to . . . .'" Id. at 244 n.2 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 104.38) (1973).
In its analysis, the Court conceded that newspapers today bear little resemblance
to those of 1791; instead, the "concentration of control of media" has resulted in
"vast accumulations of unreviewable power in the modern media empires." Id. at 249-
50. The Court noted that access proponents argued that "[tihe First Amendment inter-
est of the public in being informed is said to be in peril because the 'marketplace of
ideas' is today a monopoly controlled by the owners of the market." Id. at 251.
Relying on its holding in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
(noting that "a free press is a condition of a free society"), the Court stated that
there was no difference between preventing the Miami Herald from publishing what it
wanted and forcing it to print something it did not. Id. at 256. The Court wrote that
"[tihe Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regu-
lation forbidding appellant [Miami Herald] to publish specified matter." Id.
Furthermore, the Court found the statutes unconstitutional for two reasons: first,
because they effectively "exact[ed] a penalty" in the amount of "the cost in printing
and composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be devoted to
other material the newspaper may have preferred to print," and, second, because of
the "intrusion into the function of editors." Id. at 256-58. This editorial function en-
compasses both deciding the content and size of the newspaper, as well as treating
issues. Id. at 258. Concerning the editorial function, the Court observed (in re this
editorial function) that "[iut has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees
of a free press as they have evolved to this time." Id.
148. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
149. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (invalidating as compelling speech a rule requiring inclusion
of a newsletter critical of the utility company).
Additionally, there was no "counterbalancing" interest in their enactment,
as there was in the right of reply statute invalidated in Tornillo.n Thus,
the Court determined that the statutes were based on neither the cable
operators' nor the broadcasters' speech content. 5'
The Court also rejected TBS's "altered message" argument, a subset of
the compelled speech argument in which TBS argued that in complying
with the must-carry provisions, it would be forcibly identified with mes-
sages it did not wish to convey.'52 In dismissing this contention, the
Court relied on the fact that cable has, historically, served merely as a
conduit for broadcast signals, with "little risk that cable viewers would
assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey
ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator.""n
Lastly, the Court found TorniUo uncontrolling because of the funda-
mental technological differences between newspapers and cable televi-
sion."M The Court observed that, regardless of the extent of the control
which a newspaper may exert over its own content, it has no influence
over the distribution of competing newspapers in the same area.55 Ca-
ble, on the other hand, does have that power, thanks to the very nature
of the medium; "the physical connection between the television set and
the cable network gives the cable operator bottleneck or gatekeeper,
control over most (if not all) of the television programming that is chan-
neled into the subscriber's home."" This control gives the cable opera-
tor power that a newspaper editor does not have: the power to silence
competing voices "with a mere flick of the switch."'
Realizing that the potential abuse of this power must be considered,
the Court stated that "[t]he First Amendment's command that govern-
ment not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the government
from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through
150. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2465; see supra note 147. While the purpose of the right
of reply statute invalidated in Tornilo was to ensure a balance of competing view-
points, is Congress not attempting to affect the same type of counterbalancing with
must-carry by ensuring that the cable-viewing public is exposed to both local and
distant stations?
151. Turner, 114 S. Ct at 2465.
152. Id. Here, TBS contended that cable operators might be forced to alter their
programming in order to respond to that of the broadcasters. Id. Additionally, they
voiced fears that viewers would associate the views espoused by broadcasters with
the cable operators themselves. Id.
153. Id. The Court also noted that broadcasters are required to identify themselves
once per hour. Id. at 2465-66; see FCC Rule Concerning Station Identification 47
C.F.R. § 73.1201 (1993).
154. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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physical control of a critical pathway of communication,"u the free flow
of information and ideas."
5 9
iii. Favored speaker
TBS also argued for a strict scrutiny analysis based on the language in
Buckley v. Valeo,Iu in which the Court stated that "the government may
not 'restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to en-
hance the relative voice of others."''" TBS contended that a broadcast
coverage requirement would lead to cable programmers being dropped,
creating an inequity in treatment.'62
The Court felt, however, that TBS misinterpreted Buckley's reasoning
and holding, stating that the holding was not so broad as to render all
speaker-partial laws presumtively invalid." Instead, Buckley was more
properly grounded in the communicative impact of the speech in-
volved. 1
4
As with Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the regulations invalidated in
Buckley were content-based." Thus, the Court noted that "Buckley...
stands for the proposition that laws favoring some speakers over others
158. Strangely enough, while both the Court and Congress have repeatedly stressed
the importance of broadcasting, here, for the first time, the Court referred to cable
as a critical area. See id.
159. Id. This philosophy is apparent in the regulation of broadcasting. See, e.g., 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988) (allowing revocation of license for failure to allow access to
candidates for federal office); FCC Personal Attacks Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1993)
(requiring notification and an opportunity to respond to victims of on-air personal
attacks).
This philosophy notwithstanding, the Court seems to blame the cable industry as
if it had invented its own regulatory scheme. The "bottleneck" had been addressed in
earlier legislation requiring an A/B switch, which allowed cable subscribers to switch
effortlessly between cable and broadcasters, but was dropped in the 1992 Act. See 47
U.S.C. § 534(e) (Supp. V 1993). Lastly, the Court referred at several points to the al-
most monopolistic power of cable operators, while admitting that "the cable medium
may depend for its very existence upon express permission from local governing
authorities." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2452.
160. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding a regulation prohibiting political con-
tributions of more than $1,000.00).
161. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2467.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17.
demand strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference reflects
a content preference.""'
Since the Court already determined that the must-carry provisions are
not content-based,67 it quickly dismissed TBS's proposed application of
Buckley, stating that "the fact that the provisions benefit broadcast-
ers... does not call for strict scrutiny under our precedents.""u
iv. Disfavored treatment
As its last argument for strict scrutiny analysis, TBS contended that
Congress had singled out certain members of the press for disfavored
treatment by imposing burdens on cable, while not imposing like burdens
on other, non-broadcast media' 69
The Court agreed that laws which "discriminate among media ... of-
ten present serious First Amendment concerns."'v" Nevertheless, such
regulations do not per se merit strict scrutiny.' 7' The Court stated that
166. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2467.
167. See supra note 121-28 and accompanying text.
168. Turner, 114 S. CL at 2467.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2468. The Court noted two examples of such discrimination. In Minneap-
olis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-92
(1983), the Court ruled unconstitutional a state tax on newspapers which consumed
over $100,000 in paper and ink per year. Id. The Court found this burden unconstitu-
tional for two reasons: first, because it singled out the press for disfavored treatment,
and second, because it targeted a small group within the press itself. Id. at 591.
The Court found that the ability of the Government to single out the press for
regulation was a "powerful weapon" which had the potential for abuse in censoring
the press in its fundamental role-acting as a restraint on government. Id. at 585.
The Court did suggest, however, that a "special characteristic" of the press could
justify differential treatment. Id.
The Court also found that, while "[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua
non of a violation of the First Amendment," the law here impacted such a small
group that it raised a presumption that it was, in fact, a penalty. Id. at 592.
In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), the Court,
following the line of reasoning in Minneapolis Star, invalidated an Arkansas tax
scheme which exempted newspapers while taxing magazines, stating that "[olur cases
clearly establish that a discriminatory tax on the press burdens rights protected by
the First Amendment." Id. at 227.
The Court found that this tax treated some members of the press (magazines)
less favorably than others (newspapers, etc.); thus, it targeted a small group-the
second part of the analysis in Minneapolis Star. Id. at 227-28; see Minneapolis Star,
460 U.S. at 591. Additionally, the Court found the tax to be inextricably linked to
content, a distinction which Justice Marshall called "particularly repugnant." Arkansas
Writers', 481 U.S. at 229. Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court determined
that Arkansas had failed to justify the statute. Id. at 233.
171. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468. For example, in Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439
(1991), the Court upheld an Arkansas law requiring taxation of cable services, while
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both Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue and Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland were not con-
trolling, as both were based on fears of distortion of the "marketplace of
ideas" due to the small number of speakers targeted. 2 Additionally, the
Court noted that such differential treatment may be justified by special
characteristics of the medium.
In the Court's view, one such special characteristic which justifies
differential treatment in the instant case is the "bottleneck monopoly
power" of cable. 4 The Court called this power "a demonstrable threat
to the survival of broadcast television."'75 This threat, combined with
the fact that the regulations are broad-based, rendered the reasoning of
Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project inapposite.' Thus,
TBS's last argument for strict scrutiny was rejected. In dismissing the
applicability of strict scrutiny analysis, the Court stated that "[iln sum,
the must-carry provisions do not pose such inherent dangers to free
expression, or present such potential for censorship or manipulation, as
to justify application of the most exacting level of First Amendment scru-
tiny." 7
3. Narrowly Tailored
After agreeing with the district court that the O'Brien standard was
applicable, the Court next examined the must-carry provisions to see if
"the restriction was no greater than essential to further the Government's
interest."' 8
The Court observed that Congress found three compelling interests to
be served by the must-carry provisions: first, "preserving the benefits...
providing an exemption for newspapers. Id. The Court stated that, while "differential
taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to
suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints," in the instant case, the
tax did not target the press and posed no threat to the press' function as "a watch-
dog of government activity." Id. at 447.
172. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468 (quoting Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2469.
178. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). The Court
noted that this does not equate to the best restrictive means available, but merely
that the regulation must be no more restrictive than necessary. Id.
of over-the-air local broadcast television;" second, "promoting the wide-
spread dissemination of information;" and, third, "promoting fair compe-
tition in... television programming." l'9 The Court stated that "each of
[these] is an important governmental interest.""8
Despite this, the Court stated that in order to show that the provisions
are, indeed, narrowly tailored, the Government must "demonstrate that
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regula-
tion will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.''.
Thus, in order to validate the must-carry provisions, the Government
has the burden of showing that the local broadcast industry is in eco-
nomic peril, that the must-carry provisions will alleviate their plight, and
that the provisions do not impose burdens on "'substantially more speech
than necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.' '"" In
examining the record, the Court stated that "we are unable to conclude
that the Government has satisfied either inquiry." "
179. Id.
180. Id. In a review of the importance of over-the-air broadcast, the Court looked
at the rationale behind the creation of the Communications Act of 1934, 'stating that
Congress wished "to afford each community of appreciable size an over-the-air source
of information and an outlet for exchange on matters of local concern." Id. (citing
United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 173-74 (1968)). Additionally, the
compelling interest in broadcast still exists, even with the advent of cable, as forty
percent of Americans still do not have cable. Id. at 2469-70.
The Court also noted two other interests. The first interest is in "assuring that
the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources." Id. at 2470; see FCC
v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (stating that
"[ilt was not inconsistent with the statutory scheme, therefore, for the Commission to
conclude that the maximum benefit to the 'public interest' would follow some alloca-
tion of broadcast licenses so as to promote diversification of the mass media as a
whole"); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668, n.27 (1972) (uphold-
ing FCC's authority to regulate cable television) (stating that the First Amendment
"rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of a free society") and
(quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944))).
Second, the Government has a compelling interest in "eliminating restraints on
fair competition." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470; see Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143 (1951) (holding that a newspaper which refused to accept advertising
from anyone who advertised on the local radio station an attempt to establish an
illegal monopoly).
181. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470; see City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communica-
tions, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the Court
may not "simply assume" that an ordinance will advance the state interests asserted);
Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)
(stating that a regulation which is reasonable on its face may be "highly capricious"
if the problem does not exist).
182. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 799 (1989)).
183. Id.
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While agreeing with the Government that substantial deference should
be given to the predictive judgments of Congress," such deference
does not, in the Court's view, insulate judgments involving the First
Amendment from judicial review altogether." Rather, the Court is obli-
gated to assure that "Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence.""
The Government put forth two propositions in support of the necessity
of the must-carry provisions: first, that without must-carry, cable opera-
tors would refuse carriage to significant numbers of broadcasters; and,
second, that those stations denied carriage would deteriorate or fail.'
Noting substantial disagreement over the statistics cited by the Govern-
ment, the Court stated that, even if it assumed, arguendo, the veracity of
the statistics, the Government must also demonstrate that financial harm
would be suffered by those broadcasters that would be dropped. 1" Cit-
ing a "paucity of evidence""8 in this regard, the Court noted that the
Government failed to carry its burden of proof."in
Additionally, the Court stated that the impact of must-carry in other
areas, such as the extent to which cable operators will be forced to
change their programming, how many programmers will be dropped, and
whether must-carry provisions can be satisfied by merely using unused
channels, must be furthered investigated.'' The Court, calling these an-
swers "critical," stated that "unless we know the extent to which the
must-carry provisions in fact interfere with protected speech, we cannot
say whether they suppress 'substantially more speech than...
necessary.'""'
184. Id. at 2471.
185. Id.
186. Id.; see Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (stating that, when infringing on First Amendment rights, the Government "must
be able to adduce either empirical support or at least sound reasoning on behalf of
its measures"); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594 (1981) (stat-
ing that "we recognize[] that the Commission's decisions must sometimes rest on
judgment and prediction rather than pure factual determinations").
187. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2471.
188. Id. at 2471-72.
189. Id. at 2472. The Court observed that the Government introduced no evidence
of any local broadcasters filing for bankruptcy, turning in their licenses, cutting back
on operations, or even suffering serious reductions in revenues. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The Court also noted the absence of judicial findings on the availability of
any less restrictive means of accomplishing Congress' asserted goals. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
The Court concluded that, "the importance of the issues to the broad-
cast and cable industries" necessitated that it remand the case to allow
for a fuller development of the record before passing on the constitu-
tional validity of the must-carry provisions.'93
B. Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun, in a brief, one-paragraph concurrence," wrote that
Justice Kennedy's opinion "aptly identifies and analyzes the First Amend-
ment concerns and principles" involved in regulation of the cable indus-
try.'95 Justice Blackmun wrote separately merely to stress a single
point-deference to the judgment of Congress."
Justice Blackmun emphasized the "paramount importance" of deferring
to the predictions and findings of Congress.'97 To support his position,
this deference, Justice Blackmun pointed to the "extensive" findings that
Congress made in the course of hearings on the 1992 Cable Act."'
193. Id.
194. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
195. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
196. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973). Justice Blackinun obviously felt that Congress
acted in the public good in passing the Cable Act, but Oliver Wendell Holmes' words
on the development of the Common Law are instructive:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt ne-
cessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963).
197. The "predictions" which Justice Blaclun refers to are those relative to the
broadcast industry's need for protection. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2472 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). The value of the predictions of Congress are called into question by
Justice Ginsburg's dissent. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2481; infra notes 247-57 and
accompanying text.
198. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., concurring). One commentator has
outlined more pragmatic reasons for the 1992 Cable Act. Frank Lloyd has posited
three main reasons for the Act: first, cable operators were unable to expand service
capacity after the 1984 Cable Act; second, some cable operators were in "highly visi-
ble disputes" with members of congressional committees charged with communica-
tions legislation; and third, a coalition of cable's competitors mounted "relentless
attacks" on the cable industry. Lloyd, supra note 6, at 24. Mr. Lloyd stated that these
competitors included the "wireless cable" industry, the direct broadcast satellite indus-
try and the telephone industry. Id. Most importantly, broadcasters lobbied strongly for
the "must-carry" provisions, which were eventually made a part of the Act. Id.
When the fate of the Act was in doubt, and when several unions joined with
the powerful Consumer Federation of America in backing the broadcasters, the "must-
carry" provisions were included, and the Act was passed. Id.
This picture of influence and power is undoubtedly a far cry from what Justice
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While supporting the remand,'" Justice Blackmun concluded by inti-
mating that, with proper development of the record on the congressional
findings, the Government will likely be able to support a motion for sum-
mary judgment.2" Referring to the Government's introduction of Con-
gressional findings, Justice Blackmun stated that "[tihe record before the
District Court no doubt will benefit from any additional evidence the
Government and the other parties now see fit to present.""' In essence,
Justice Blackmun concurred with the remand purely on principle, while
hinting that the outcome will eventually be the same.
C. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens, in his separate opinion,"2 agreed with Justice
Kennedy's reasoning, yet disagreed with his conclusion, writing that
there was no reason to remand the case, as the lower court "reached the
correct result the first time around."2' Misgivings notwithstanding, Jus-
tice Stevens wrote in concurrence with the judgment as an "accommo-
dation" in order to assure a majority.2"
Blackmun envisioned when he called for deference to Congressional predictions. Jus-
tice Blackmun seemed to envision legislators as trustees of the public good. Francois
Rene De Chateaubriand's words are relevant here: "[A]re Americans perfect men? Do
they not have their vices as do other men? Are they morally superior to the English
from whom they draw their origin. ... Will not the mercantile spirit dominate
them? Will not self-interest begin to be the dominant national fault?" Francois Rene
De Chateaubriand, 'The United States Today' in Travels in America, in THE FABER
BOOK OF AMERICA 162, 163 (Christopher Ricks & William L. Vance eds. & Richard
Switzer trans., 1992).
Indeed, Walt Whitman once wrote, excoriating the very legislative body in which
Justice Blackmun places so much faith, that "[t]he official services of America, na-
tional, state, and municipal, in all their branches and departments, except the judi-
ciary, are saturated in corruption, bribery, falsehood, mal-administration; and the judi-
ciary is tainted." WALT WHITMAN, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS 179 (1871). Whitman concluded
his essay by noting that "our New World democracy, however great a success in
uplifting the masses out of their sloughs ... is, so far, an almost complete failure in
its social aspects, and in really grand religious, moral, literary, and esthetic [sic] re-
sults." Id. at 180. In point of fact, qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare (he who
does not know how to lie does not know how to rule) seems germane. See EUGENE
EHRLICH, AMOS, AMAS, AMAT AND MORE 239 (1985).
199. Turner, 114 S. Ct at 2473 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
200. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
202. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
203. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
204. Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
Justice Stevens agreed that the interest in ensuring the continued exis-
tence of the broadcast industry is "unquestionably substantial."2 5 He
also felt, like Justice Kennedy, that the "bottleneck monopoly," which
cable operators enjoy merits more intrusive regulation than other me-
dia."°6 While agreeing with Justice Kennedy's reasoning, Justice Stevens
disagreed with his conclusion, stating that "the question for us is merely
whether Congress could fairly conclude that cable operators' mon6poly
position threatens the continued viability of broadcast television and that
must-carry is an appropriate means of minimizing that risk.""7 While
this seems to be merely a reformulation of the standard applied by Jus-
tice Kennedy,2" Justice Stevens stated frankly that "[iun my view... ap-
plication of that standard would require affirmance here,"" as he found
that the threat posed by cable "is at least plausible."
210
The main point of divergence between the two concerned the suffi-
ciency of the evidence supporting the must-carry provisions.2"' Justice
Stevens felt it a "practical certainty" that broadcasters would suffer eco-
nomic harm if dropped from the local cable service.2 He felt it a rea-
sonable inference that the unregulated power of cable operators would,
inevitably, lead to such harm.1 3 Justice Stevens noted that the must-
carry provisions are "a simple and direct means of dealing with the dan-
gers posed."2" Additionally, he noted that economically viable broad-
casters would pursue the alternative retransmission consent route, leav-
ing must-carry to those without the bargaining power of high ratings or
network affiliation.2 "0
205. Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
206. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
207. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens noted that the basis for
such legislation could not be overly firm, as "economic measures are always subject
to second-guessing." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part). The Justice called the fore-
casts upon which the Act was predicated "provisional" and "uncertain." Id. (Stevens,
J., concurring in part).
208. Id. at 2471.
209. Id. at 2473 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
210. Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
211. Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
212. Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). The Justice noted two facts in
support of this contention: first, that 60% of Americans have cable, and second, that
most cable customers' only way to receive television signals is through their cable.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
213. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens cited the lower court's
opinion, in which Judge Jackson wrote of the "indisputable" dominance of cable,
giving operators "both incentive and present ability" to destroy the broadcast industry.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819
F. Supp. 32, 46 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994)).
214. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
215. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
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Justice Stevens was also somewhat critical of the Court's insistence on
a fuller development of the record at the District Court, because to him,
the questions which Justice Kennedy posited did not lend themselves to
definitive answers, but to predictive judgment." The Justice wrote that
such evidence might help in determining "the efficacy and wisdom" of
the must-carry regulations, but was not needed to determine their consti-
tutionality."7
Lastly, Justice Stevens was suspicious of the value of such evidence,
stating that interpreting such evidence would "require the District Court
to engage in speculation; it may actually invite the parties to adjust their
conduct in an effort to affect the result of this litigation."2"' The Justice
concluded by stating that the provisions are "rationally calculated to
redress the dangers that Congress discerned after its lengthy investiga-
tion of the relationship between the cable and broadcasting indus-
tries."
219
D. Justice O'Connor's Opinion, Concurring in Part, Dissenting in
Part
Justice O'Connor, in her separate opinion,20 reached a conclusion
diametrically opposed to that of Justice Kennedy, writing that the must-
carry provisions fail any level of heightened First Amendment scruti-
ny."' As Justice O'Connor noted, "[iut is as if the government ordered
all movie theaters to reserve at least one-third of their screening for films
216. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part); see id. at 2470.
217. Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Indeed, Justice Stevens admitted
that the provisions "may ultimately prove an ineffective or needlessly meddlesome
means of achieving Congress' legitimate goals." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
In point of fact, the Cable Act of 1992 had already proven a failure. According to a
survey conducted in September 1993, 34% of respondents reported that they had been
notified in the past month that their cable bill was going up. G. GALLUP, JR., THE
GALLUP POLL, PUBIC OPINION 1993 163 (1994).
218. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). It seems strange
that Justice Stevens had no such doubts about the prognostications of Congress. See
id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (urging "special respect" for the findings
of Congress).
219. Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
220. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor was
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Scalia and, in part, by Justice Thomas. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
221. Id. at 2480-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
made by American production companies, or required all bookstores to
devote one-third of their shelf space to nonprofit publishers."222
1. Content-based Analysis
Justice O'Connor began her analysis by noting the two groups of
speakers which must-carry implicates.2" The first is cable operators, as
they are required to carry particular programmers and simultaneously
prevented them from carrying others.224 The second is cable program-
mers, who are deprived of access to one-third of available channels by
the must-carry provisions.225 In examining the burden imposed on each
of these, Justice O'Connor observed that laws singling out specific speak-
ers present a substantial danger.226 This danger is present even when
the laws do not draw explicit distinctions based on content.227
While agreeing that content-neutral restrictions on speakers are not
ipso facto subject to strict scrutiny analysis, Justice O'Connor found that
the must-carry provisions are, quite clearly, based on a preference for
content.22 In support of this conclusion the Justice noted several Con-
gressional findings which referenced a content preference,2" calling
them "strong evidence of the statute's justifications." '
222. Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
223. Id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
224. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
225. Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
226. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
227. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 584, 591-92 (1983); see
also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447-49 (1991).
228. Turner, 114 S. Ct at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
229. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see 47 U.S.C. § 521
(Supp. V 1993). The first statement that Justice O'Connor highlighted was Congress'
justification of the must-carry provisions by reference to the importance in promoting
"a diversity of views." Id. § 521(a)(6). Additionally, the Act states that public
television's educational and informational programming advances "the Government's
compelling interest in educating its citizens." Id. § 521(a)(8)(A). The Act further stat-
ed that there is a "substantial governmental interest" in preserving locally originated
programming. Id. § 521(a)(10). Lastly, the Act states that broadcast stations "continue
to be an important source of local news and public affairs programming and other
local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate." Id. § 521(a)(11).
230. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor also noted the mandate that the FCC "afford particular attention to
the value of localism" when determining if a station is eligible for must-carry. Id. at
2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 534(h)(1)(C)(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). In examining low-power stations, the FCC
must determine if the station would provide "'local news and informational needs
which are not being adequately served by full power television broadcast stations.'"
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
[Vol. 23: 651, 1996] TBS v. FCC
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Even after finding that the must-carry provisions were founded on a
preference for broadcasters over cable operators and not on actual hos-
tility toward cable operators, or a desire to suppress their speech, Justice
O'Connor nevertheless found that strict scrutiny analysis applied, stating
that "benign motivation ... is not enough."23' Indeed, Congress's moti-
vation, 'no matter how praiseworthy, is directly tied to the content of
what the speakers will likely say."2"2 Justice O'Connor further stated
that, even if Congress had content-neutral reasons in mind, "we have
never held that the presence of a permissible justification lessens the
impropriety of relying in part on an impermissible justification."'
In analyzing the must-carry provisions under strict scrutiny, the restric-
tions are unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to a compelling state
interest.' Under Justice O'Connor's analysis, "compelling" means more
than merely "legitimate, or reasonable, or even praiseworthy;"',it means
that the restriction preserves "some essential value" or serves some
§ 534(h)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
231. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
123 (1991) (invalidating New York's "Son of Sam" anti-crime-profit statute); Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
Justice O'Connor also noted that the First Amendment generally prohibits the
Government from exempting preferred speech from regulation. Turner Broadcasting
Sys., 114 S. Ct at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See
generally Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (invalidating a regulation prohibit-
ing the color reproduction of United States currency, but permitting the black-and-
white reproduction, on the grounds that it was content-based); Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (holding a ban on noncommercial
advertising facially invalid as showing a preference for commercial advertising); Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (finding unconstitutional an Illinois statute which al-
lowed only labor-dispute-related picketing of homes); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding an ordinance that prohibited one form of picket-
ing while allowing another was violative of the Equal Protection Clause); Cox v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (noting that a law against meetings and assemblies had
not been applied uniformly and consistently).
232. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor strongly disagreed with Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the must-
carry provisions are content-neutral, stating that "it is fair to assume that those find-
ings reflect the basis for the legislative decision." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). In the instant case, "[tihe controversial judgment at the heart
of the statute is not that broadcast television has some value--obviously it does-but
that broadcasters should be preferred over cable programmers." Id. at 2477-78
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
233. Id. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
234. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
"pressing public necessity."2 35 For Justice O'Connor, the interest in pre-
serving localism, while legitimate, or possibly even important, "cannot be
described as 'compelling' for the purposes of the compelling state inter-
est test." 6
2. Content-neutral Analysis
Justice O'Connor, assuming arguendo that the must-carry provisions
are not content-based, stated that the provisions are so broad that "they
fail content-neutral scrutiny as well," 7 as they are not narrowly tai-
lored.2" A regulation is not narrowly tailored if "a substantial portion of
the burden on speech does not serve to advance [the State's content-
neutral] goals."239
Given that the goal of the 1992 Act was the promotion of competi-
tion,240 Justice O'Connor found the must-carry provisions "fatally
overbroad," as they impose burdens on cable operators who have no
anticompetitive motives and afford must-carry status to broadcasters
who would survive even without it.
241
To Justice O'Connor, the cable operators, rather than Congress, should
control programming.24 2 While admitting that many cable operators are
monopolists,243 Justice O'Connor wrote that there are many other ways
in which Congress could better serve these interests, such as direct
subsidies2" or encouraging the development of new media 4 1 In exam-
235. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
236. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
237. Id. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
238. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
239. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 122 (1991)); see, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (stating
that a ban on all leafleting in order to eradicate litter is overly broad).
240. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
241. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor echoed the language of Justice Marshall in Arkansas Writers' Project
v. Ragland, when he criticized the Arkansas tax scheme as "both overinclusive and
underinclusive," as "the most lucrative and well-established" newspapers received tax
breaks, while struggling magazines would not, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987). See Turner,
114 S. Ct. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
242. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
243. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Affiliated Capital
Corp. v. Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1563 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that "[clable television,
like electric utilities, is generally considered a natural monopoly"), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1053 (1986).
244. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
245. Id. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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ining the current version of must-carry, Justice O'Connor wrote that,
while Congress may restrict speech, it must comply with the require-
ments of the First Amendment-"requirements that were not complied
with here."246
E. Justice Ginsburg's Opinion, Concurring in Part, Dissenting in
Part
In a pithy dissent,247 Justice Ginsburg stated that the 1992 Cable Act
does have a base in content.2 She further expressed her doubts about
the broadcast industry actually being in danger.249 Thus, she believed
that the Cable Act was properly analyzed under a strict scrutiny para-
digm, which it failed.sn
Relying heavily on the dissenting opinion from the lower court, Justice
Ginsburg argued that the must-carry provisions have an "unwarranted
content-based preference." 5' While acknowledging that the must-carry
provisions do not differentiate on the basis of viewpoint, Justice
Ginsburg stated that "the rules... do reflect a content preference, and
on that account demand close scrutiny."252
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that, even though a content-
neutral reason was found for the Act,2n she found persuasive the words
of Circuit Judge Williams, who noted that "Congress rested its decision
to promote [local broadcast] stations in part, but quite explicitly, on a
finding about their content-that they were 'an important source of local
news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast services
critical to an informed electorate.'"'
246. Id. at 2480-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
247. Id. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
248. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
249. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
250. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
251. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
252. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
253. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg noted the
majority's finding that the objective of the Act was "the preservation of over-the-air
television service for those unwilling or unable to subscribe to cable." Turner, 114 S.
Ct. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see id. at 2461-62,
2471-72.
254. Id. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Turner
Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 58 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams, J., dissenting),
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994)) (alteration in original).
Finally, Justice Ginsburg expressed doubt that the broadcast industry
is actually in jeopardy,255 writing bluntly that "the 'facts do not support
an inference that over-the-air television is at risk.'"2"' In Justice
Ginsburg's view, if such facts are not adduced on remand, it should "im-
pel" a judgment for Turner Broadcasting. '
V. IMPACT OF THE DECISION
Turner, more than any of its must-carry progenitors, has had an imme-
diate economic impact on Americans. Although the Cable Act gave mu-
nicipalities the power to regulate rates, most waited for the outcome of
this case to exercise those powers. Many towns, taking the Court's deci-
sion as a tacit validation of the Act in toto, quickly moved to slash rates
in its wake.2" This power, however, has proven illusory, for while they
do have the power to regulate rates on basic service, cable operators
make up for the loss of revenue by raising prices on premium channels,
such as HBO.25 Thus, many cable subscribers have actually seen a rise
in cable prices.2"
As to must-carry itself, it, too, has proved to be a mixed blessing.
While more local broadcasters are being carried, many consumers are
confused and upset at the constant reshuffling of channel lineups.26'
Due to the channel positioning requirements, many stations which are
local favorites have been moved to less-favorable, higher-numbered
channels."
The broadcasters, however, find themselves in a position of power
since they must either be carried or compensated. This has led to de-
255. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
256. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Turner, 819 F.
Supp. at 63 (Williams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, Turner, 114 S. Ct. 2445). Justice
Ginsburg's doubts may be confirmed by Congress itself. Tentative figures that were
provided by Congress show that during the period of deregulation, 1985-1992, only
2096 of cable operators dropped even a single broadcast station. MacLachlan, supra
note 8, at 29. This statistic questions contentions that, absent protectionist legislation,
broadcast stations would be summarily ejected in droves from cable systems.
257. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Interestingly, Judge Ginsburg was part of the unanimous decision in Quincy Cable
which invalidated a previous "must-carry" provision. See Quincy Cable Television v.
FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
258. See Angela Paik, Board Orders Cuts in Basic Cable Rates, PfflLA. INQUIRER,
Feb. 13, 1995, at MD3.
259. See Scott Hadly, Simi Orders Comcast to Cut Rates, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995,
at B5.
260. See GALLUP, supra note 217, at 163.
261. See Anthony Faiola, Cable Changed, but Was It for the Better?, MIAMi HERALD,
July 10, 1994, at IK
262. See Phil Kloer, Remodeling at CNN, ATLANTA CONST., June 14, 1994, at El.
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mands by some broadcasters that border on extortion.20 For other
broadcasters, must-carry has been a Godsend, affording them exposure
that would have been impossible without the rules.2' For at least one
broadcaster, must-carry may be a boon in the salability of the station
itself, as the price of the station trebles if the must-carry rules are upheld
on remand.20
Implications for the future impact of this decision are, perhaps, more
far-reaching. By rejecting the Red Lion standard for cable, the Court has
effectively adjudged the O'Brien analysis applicable to all forms of com-
munication which are not subject to application of the scarcity rationale.
It follows, therefore, that any new form of communication which fits
within the rather broad parameters of the decision here will be treated
likewise.
For example, the "information superhighway" will rely heavily on the
cable systems of telephone companies and cable operators for transmis-
sion of data.2" If the current must-carry provisions are viewed as an ob-
stacle by those companies, they will be reticent about making the capital
investment needed to establish the infrastructure for the information su-
perhighway." '
Additionally, even though the current Act contains provisions exempt-
ing Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) systems from must-carry, the cur-
rent success of GM Hughes Electronics' direct-to-home satellite television
service seems to cast doubt upon the industry's further exemption.2"
263. Frederic Biddle, Cablevision, Channel 4 Play "Game of Chicken," BOSTON
GLoBE, Aug. 3, 1994, at 68. In Boston, one particularly popular broadcasting station
threatened to drop off the cable system if the cable operator did not pay. Id. In
other locales, however, accommodation has been the order of the day. For example,
many cable operators have agreed to carry NBC-affiliated cable programming in lieu
of cash compensation. Id.
264. Phil Kloer, On Television; WTLK Finally Gets Big-Time Cable Break, ATLANTA
CONST., Aug. 2, 1994, at C8. In WTLKs instance, must-carry gave the small station
access to more than 8096 of Atlanta's homes with cable. Id.
265. In Brief, MINN. STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 18, 1994, at 3D. In the sale of WHAI, in
Bridgeport, Connecticut, the station commanded a price of 3.9 million dollars. Id. The
price will rise to almost twelve million dollars if must-carry is finally upheld. Id.
266. See Paul Farhi, Southwestern Bell, Cox Call Off Cable Merger, WASH. POST,
Apr. 6, 1994, at Dl.
267. See id. As James Robbins, president of Cox Cable stated, "[tihe Administration
seems intent on creating the information highway and the FCC seems intent on blow-
ing up the bridges." Id.
268. See James F. Peltz, Hughes' DirecTv Already a Rival to Cable, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1995, at Dl.
Due to the affordability and programming selection afforded by Hughes'
DirecTv, DBS has enjoyed phenomenal growth since its inception.2"
Some analysts feel that it may eventually supplant cable as the medium
of choice. ° While local broadcasters are not currently available via
DBS, if cable is replaced as the dominant means of conveying television
signals, it is highly likely that legislation analogous to the current must-
carry would place those broadcasters on the DBS menu.
VI. CONCLUSION
While not answering the question of whether the current must-carry
provisions are invalid, the Court has, finally, set the standard for free
speech analysis of cable television, once again reaffirming the validity of
tripartite First Amendment protection. Under this new paradigm, the
print media is entitled to strict scrutiny, cable to the mid-tier O'Brien
protection, and broadcast to the least-restrictive Red Lion standard.
In the arena of must-carry, it is highly probable that each new medium
will be subject to these provisions. Indeed, given that cable has been
heavily regulated almost from creation, it is not clear if Congress (or the
courts) would even wait to examine the viability of each before subject-
ing them to must-carry."' Regardless, local broadcasters will be protect-
ed. Given the clout which these broadcasters wield in the communica-
tions milieu, George Orwell's First Commandment still rings true:
"ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL. BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL
THAN OTHERS."272
R. STUART PHILLIPS
269. Id. DirecTv costs, on average, thirty dollars a month to provide access to at
least 150 channels. Id.
270. See id. DirecTv already has 400,000 subscribers and will probably reach over
1.5 million by 1996. Id. The service will soon be expanding to Mexico, South Ameri-
ca, and the Caribbean, with a potential audience of 77 million households. Id. In fact,
DirecTv's sales have surpassed the popularity of the VCR and compact disc. Id. at
DII. As Rich D'Amato, spokesman for the National Cable Television Association stat-
ed, "We view them as real, significant and very well-financed competition." Id.
271. See generally Fred H. Catz, Communications Policy Making, Competition, and
the Public Interest: The New Dialogue, 68 IND. L.J. 665 (1993); Allen S. Hammond, IV,
Regulating Broadband Communication Networks, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 18 (1992).
272. GEORGE ORwELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946).
